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ABSTRACT. For a large homogeneous population, where individuals rely on the availability of a resource
for survival, we introduce a continuous time model for the availability of the resource in time and for each
individual. In this framework, cooperation is defined as a mutual insurance mechanism, aimed at covering
shortages for group members. We explore essential questions regarding the importance of cooperation: what
are the characteristics of populations where cooperation is valuable, versus individualist populations, where
cooperation destroys value; how large should be the groups of cooperating entities? In order to answer the
latter question, we first characterise the optimal cooperation, which maximises the expected lifetime of entities
in the population. Secondly, we explore the same question using a non cooperative stochastic game. This
allows to understand to what extent strategic cooperation leads to inefficiencies as compared with optimal
cooperation. We complete the theoretical results by suggestive numerical approaches.
KEYWORDS: risk sharing, mutual insurance, stochastic games in continuous time, inefficiencies of Nash
equilibria, network formation.
1.INTRODUCTION
For a large homogeneous population where a non perishable good (that we call resource) is needed
for survival, we propose a continuous time model for the availability of the resource in time and for each
individual. In this framework, cooperation is defined as transfers of the resource between members in a
given group, from those having a surplus towards those having a shortage of the resource. In other words, the
notion of cooperation is to be understood in this paper as a mechanism of mutual insurance, where negative
shocks (shortages of the resource) of some group members can be absorbed by positive shocks (surpluses) of
other group members. Without any cooperation, an individual suffering from shortage of resource at a point
in time is considered extinct from that time on. As cooperation creates dependencies between members,
the evolution of the resource availability needs to be considered jointly, at the level of a group. By relying on
the theory of Markov processes, we effectively measure the effects of cooperation on the expected lifetimes
of group members. This allows to characterise the level of optimal cooperation, that leads to a maximal
expected lifetime for group members. Achieving such an optimal level of cooperation would a priori require
the presence of a regulator or central planner that forces groups of a certain size to form. The question
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that arises naturally is under what circumstances the population may reach by itself the optimal level of
cooperation without such an intervention of a central planner, and to what extent inefficiencies appear.
To tackle this important question, we derive endogenously the size of cooperating groups, using a
continuous time, non-cooperative stochastic game, where groups may decide to enlarge and include new
individuals, with whom to cooperate from that point in time on, while exterior individuals decide on whether
to join or not such groups. Once formed, a group follows the rules of cooperation without defection. Here,
the underlying assumption is that members are linked by an agreement, be it formal or informal, that can
be enforced.4 This assumption allows to focus our analysis solely on the process by which groups expand
to include new members and to characterise the conditions where increasing the number of members is
profitable. In our stochastic game, the actions of all players are based upon the observation of the state
process summarising the need of resource at the level of an existing group. Importantly, we also account
for the problem of adverse selection. For this, we introduce information asymmetry, and assume that
the information about the state process of isolated individuals trying to join a group is only private to
the individuals. Thus, a group that decides to expand, takes the risk to include a new member that has a
deficiency of resource. Isolated individuals (exterior to a group) and the cooperating groups are assumed
to be self-interested and aiming at maximising their respective expected lifetime. Assuming that the game
evolves as Nash equilibria are played, we define the stable coalitions, as those groups that will never enlarge,
because either they are not attractive enough for new members to join, or because they reject new members.
In this setting, we analyse the conditions under which cooperation emerges and how it evolves through
time, leading either to the existence of stable coalitions (finite by nature) or infinite size coalitions. We then
investigate whether strategic cooperation leads to inefficiencies as compared with optimal cooperation, that
would be imposed by a central planner. We express inefficiencies both in terms of group size difference
and of loss of expected lifetime, for wide ranges of the parameters, using a numerical approach.
The individuals in our model (that will be called entities) can be economic agents, households, produc-
tion and supply units, financial institutions etc. By the intended generality of its formulation, the model we
propose may apply in such diverse fields as biology, insurance, finance, management, economic and social
exchange, whenever one can abstract from some specific phenomena such as social norms or kin selection
in human populations.
1.1. Related literature and current contribution. In our approach, cooperation emerges because of an
uneven distribution of resources through time and through the population. Cooperation therefore is nothing
but a means of managing idiosyncratic risks related to the availability of the resource, based upon the idea
of reciprocity. In this respect, our model is connected to some areas of research on risk sharing, or mutual
insurance in networks. To the best of our knowledge, continuous time models of strategic network formation
4Informal arrangements may be enforced through a mix of quid pro quo, altruism (Cox [10]), or implicit social penalty costs (Besley
and Coate [6]). Our model is also compatible with the interpretation that a given group has a joint liability to a third party, even
though this is not explicitly modelled. Joint liability provides the necessary incentives for members to cooperate without defections.
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have not been considered so far in the literature. Our paper, in particular the game introduced in Section
4, is a continuous time model for strategic network formation, in a setting of a homogeneous population.
Only complete networks are however considered, and such networks can be characterised by their size.
Some key modelling differences with the existing literature, that situate at the conceptual level will
be discussed below, and we believe they complement the understanding of the value created by risk sharing.
In a nutshell, we introduce the risk of extinction of populations with deficits of resource and cooperation
is aimed at increasing expected lifetimes5. Also, we model for every individual the resource availability
(as surplus, neutral or deficit), at the difference of models relying on wealth and consumption streams for
each agent. This last aspect of our model may reveal useful in empirical applications, whenever complete
data about revenues and consumption is difficult to obtain. Hence, our approach may be considered as a
reduced-form model for mutual insurance.
Building on initial work of Bala and Goyal [4] modelling network formation as a non-cooperative game,
several economists have studied informal transfers and their effectiveness in sharing risk. Kocherlakota
[18], Kimball [17], Coate and Ravallion [8] or, more recently Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall [20] proposed
economic models and show that risk sharing among non-altruists may occur through repeated interaction
in repeated game models with self-interested agents, even without binding contracts. Generosity today is
justified by expected future reciprocity. In large homogeneous populations, theoretical results suggest that
the larger the population, the higher is the per capita utility from risk sharing, see for example Genicot and
Ray [14]. This implies that a Pareto optimal solution to risk sharing for risk averse agents consists in forming
as large a group as possible. For this reasons, risk sharing is in this literature called consumption smoothing,
as its optimal outcome is that idiosyncratic risk is fully eliminated through mutual insurance.
Our work results in a more contrasted picture: we show that even when expected lifetimes are to be
maximised by a central planner, individualistic populations do exist, where entities are better off without
any form of cooperation, or sometimes small groups represent the optimal outcomes. Consequently, it may
be optimal for subgroups of the large population to retain some idiosyncratic risk, by refusing an extended
cooperation. Furthermore, we completely characterise the populations where finite optimal cooperation
prevails (Proposition 3.6). We show that these populations are characterised by high levels of adverse selection
risk, that exceed a given threshold. This threshold is shown to be a function of other parameters of the model,
thus giving a clear picture of the tradeoffs taking place, between the implicit benefits and costs of cooperation.
These theoretical results are in line with numerous field evidence showing that smaller groups do
better than larger groups with respect to risk sharing and full risk sharing is rare. For example, Deaton [11]
(section 5.3) or research papers such as Ravallion and Dearden [26], Townsend [29], Udry [30], Grimard
[15], Ravallion and Chaudhuri [25], Fafchamps and Lund [13], Murgai et al [23], Morduch [22] test for
full consumption insurance at the village (community) level in developing countries. All of these papers
5In the case of households, extinction is to be interpreted as reaching a poverty trap and the expected lifetime refers to the average
time spent outside the poverty trap.
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reject complete risk-sharing at the level of the community and find evidence of only partial cooperation.
Some other existent theoretical results justify limited cooperation for risk sharing by frictions such as agents’
impatience (Kocherlakota [18]), costs of developing links (Bramoullé and Kranton [7]) or heterogeneity of
agents’ preferences (Sadoulet [28], Attanasio et al. [3]). Barr and Genicot [5] explore the role played by
intrinsic motivations, versus exterior constraints in reducing the sizes of cooperating groups.
In our model, the risks faced by the populations, such as the adverse selection when extending coop-
eration to new group members and the risk of extinction for a group, paired with the possibility of saving
ressources as a protection agains negative shocks, are key in the outcome that finite groups are sometimes
optimal. We present both theoretical results and numerical illustrations of the impact of these factors on
the sizes of both Pareto optimal and strategically formed groups.
A founding assumption of our model is that agents save resources for later consumption. Saving is a
mean to achieve consumption smoothing that is prevalent in all societies.We model the resource availability
process exogenously; this may take the form of surpluses (savings) or deficits (shortages). Individuals
possess a rate of surplus creation and depletion and an average time of survival in absence of a surplus.
We shall derive explicit relations between these rates, that crucially impact the sizes of the Pareto optimal
cooperating groups (Proposition 3.6) and of the strategic groups (Propositions 4.7 and 5.2). By introducing
the notion of surplus in our model, the tradeoffs that agents face are similar to the ones that correspond to
investment decisions under uncertainty, that is: keeping a safe asset (here consisting in keeping the surplus
for own consumption in the future), versus undertaking a risky investment (here consisting in rescuing one
distressed neighbour, that may be able to do the same later on). Some existing models consider endogenously
the level of savings, as resulting from a decision making that is simultaneous with the consumption and risk
sharing decisions (see Cole and Kocherlakota [9], Árahám and Laczó [1]).
The present work adds to the theory exploring risk sharing and mutual insurance, also by introducing
some novel dimensions in the problem of optimal transfers.
First, we rely on the theory of Markov processes in continuous time in order to effectively characterise
the behavior of cooperating groups, including long term evolution for infinite groups. Studying asymptotic
properties is a key aspect in the frame of long term relations, with repeated interactions. Depending on the
parameters, we show (Theorem 3.7) that in the limit of large groups, infinite cooperation leads either to
population decline and eventual extinction, or at the opposite, resource accumulation leading to abundance
and infinite lifetimes for everyone.
Second, for deriving results in a comprehensive form and avoid unnecessary complexity, we have
made the choice to situate the model directly at the level of the resource availability, through the notions
of surplus/deficit. The common approach in the literature so far has been to instead model revenues streams
for the agents, or total wealths at a point in time. In our model, the total wealth or consumption of an agent
is not specified, but instead we exogenously model the need of resource (as surplus, shortage of neutral).
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This conceptual difference with the literature is the one that makes possible to reach our objectives in the
most simple and effective way.
Finally, another specific feature of our model as compared to the literature is that we introduce the
risk of extinction. We consequently measure value in terms of expected lifetime rather than using utility
functions or monetary values. By maximising expected lifetime, we perfectly capture agents’ incentives
without the need to incorporate total wealth, consumption and utility functions within the model. We believe
that this modelling choice reinforces the applicability of our results, as in practice, utility functions, as well
as total wealth or consumption streams of agents are difficult to estimate. The parameters of our model
may be estimated from frequencies of observable events (such as acts of transfer, such that borrowing and
lending, or occurrences of shortages, surpluses etc.) instead of the use of questionnaires involving subjective
preferences. The scope of our model becomes thus more general and the results may be applied in other
areas of risk management, not necessarily involving populations.
1.2. Outline of the paper. The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we propose a simple Markov
chain model for describing the resource need of an entity without cooperation. We then proceed to introduce
cooperation and describe how it affects the evolution of the individual needs of the members of the group
and creates dependencies between the group members. In Section 3, we compute explicitly the expected
lifetime of a cooperating groups of sizeN and derive the mathematical properties of the optimal expected
lifetime. In terms of ranges of only three key variables, we can identify the populations that satisfy an optimal
infinite cooperation, versus a finite one. We then turn in Section 4 to the modelling of the self-organisation
process of entities in cooperating groups, using a continuous time strategic game and the notion of stable
coalitions. We then analyse whether this process reaches by itself an optimal level of cooperation, without
the intervention of a central planner. This topic is investigated both theoretically and using a numerical
approach in Section 5. Section 6 offers some concluding remarks.
2.THE MODEL
We introduce a continuous time model to study the emergence of cooperation within a large, homoge-
neous population composed of entities that can be economic agents, households, production and supply units
etc. The population relies on the availability of a certain resource for its survival. There is a state process
for each entity that indicates the severity of its need of resource at a point in time, with three possible states:
surplus, neutral and distress.
The entities evolve independently one from the other, unless they decide to cooperate and form a group.
We shall call such a group a coalition, as the group forms specifically for the purpose of cooperating.
Another reason for using this term, is that in the context of the strategic game in Section 4, coalitions will
be considered to act together, as one unit, relative to the rest of the players6. When an entity is not part of a
6We do not use cooperative games in this paper, and coalitions here may not split, but only enlarge.
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coalition and it reaches the state of distress, nothing more happens and we can consider it as extinct. In other
words, distress is an absorbing state for an entity in absence of cooperation. Inside a coalition on the other
hand, each entity is linked to the others by relationships of borrowing and lending of the resource. These are
aimed at improving the lifetime of the coalition’s members, with entities in a surplus state ceding the surplus
to the distressed entities. If all members of a coalition are distressed, entities cannot borrow the resource
today or in the future and such a coalition is considered extinct.
To sum up, cooperation consists in relations of borrowing and lending the resource. It is not a priori clear
that such a behaviour of cooperation is beneficial for all members, in that it increases their expected lifetime.
Our aim is to explore this question.
2.1. The state process in absence of cooperation. We first consider a population where no lending and
borrowing relations take place. The state process `(k)=(`t(k),t≥0) of a generic entity k in this population
is a stochastic process taking values in the set {−1,0,+1}, where
- state−1 indicates a shortage of resource or distress,
- state 0 indicates a normal level of the resource,
- state +1 indicates an excess of resource.
For simplicity, we will refer to “survival” state when an entity is in one of the states {0,+1}, hence not
distressed.
We consider the population is made of independent and homogeneous entities, meaning, the processes
`(i) and `(j)with i 6=j∈N∗ are independent and have the same distribution. The state process of an entity is
supposed to be a Markov chain with transition probabilities characterised by the following transition matrix:
Q(1)=
0 0 0α −(α+γ) γ
0 δ −δ
, (1)
where α>0, γ >0 and δ>0 are constants, the elements of the matrix containing the rates at which the
process transitions from one state state to another. The exponent for Q(1) is to emphasise that the matrix
characterises the time evolution of a single entity and in absence of cooperation (that is, a coalition of size 1).
Later on, we will use Q(N) for the transition matrix corresponding to a coalition of sizeN .
We assume that any entity k has the initial distribution
P[`0(k)=−1]=p, P[`0(k)=0]=(1−p)c, P[`0(k)=+1]=(1−p)(1−c),
with c := δγ+δ and p∈(0,1).
This initial distribution is known under the name of quasi-stationary distribution. We refer to Méléard
and Villemonais [21] for more details and an account of the relevance of this notion in the study of evolution
of populations before extinction. From an economical perspective, an interpretation is that individual entities
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Key parameters:
- rate of the distress arrival (in absence of a resource surplus) α>0
- rate of surplus creation (in absence of a resource surplus) γ>0
- rate of surplus depletion δ>0
- probability of being distressed for a random entity (measure of adverse selection) p∈ [0,1]
- probability of being in the neutral state given survival c= δγ+δ
- viability ratio ξ= γα
TABLE 1. Parameters characterising a random entity in absence of cooperation
have reached an equilibrium between the production and depletion of the resource: before they become
extinct, they are able to keep a constant probability of having a surplus, without dependence on the time
frame. This property is elementary: in absence of cooperation, an entity k has a stationary conditional
distribution given the entity is not distressed: for t≥0,
P[`t(k)=i|`t(k) 6=−1]=µ̄(i),∀i∈{−1,0,+1}
with µ̄ :{−1,0,+1}→ [0,1] given by:
µ̄(−1)=0, µ̄(0)=c, µ̄(+1)=1−c. (2)
In Table 1 we summarise the parameters characterising a random entity. In our model, the level of resource
that is available for one entity may be subject to both positive and negative shocks (in practice, these may be
triggered either by unexpected levels of consumption or by varying revenues that are meant to support the con-
sumption stream through time). We notice that negative shocks arrive at rateαwhen the entity has no surplus,
or at the rate δ when the entity has a surplus. The case α>δ is compatible with the existence of an implicit “
interest”, that is earned by the holder of a surplus, as negative shocks occur less often when possessing a sur-
plus. The case α<δ reflects implicit costs of holding a surplus of the resource. Also, from our analysis later
on, it will appear that the viability ratio ξ=γ/α plays a crucial role in determining the level of cooperation.
The process characterised in (1) has the feature that it will be absorbed in finite time in the state -1, hence
an entity becomes distressed and extinct. While an entity is distressed, there are possibly other entities with
a surplus. This raises the question of an allocation of the surplus of some entities toward other, distressed
entities, with the scope of enabling them to recover from the distress state. In return, the entities ceding their
surplus at one time may in the future benefit from the surplus of other entities in case of own distress. This
is the basic idea of cooperation for survival. We next introduce a model for the effect of cooperation in a
group of fixed sizeN<∞. Afterwards, we will study the limiting behaviour whenN→∞ and finally the
size of a coalition will be derived endogenously, using a game-theoretic approach.
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2.2. Cooperation within finite groups. We generalise the previous model to describe the time evolution
of the need of resource for members of coalitions, more exactly whenN≥1 entities cooperate for survival.
Hence, by takingN=1 we recover the model without cooperation. We shall call a coalition of sizeN an
N-coalition.
We define a multivariate stochastic process L(N), hereafter named the resource availability process (or
simply the state process) of the N-coalition, that keeps track of the resource shortage or availability in a






with each component L(N)t (k) taking one of the values {−1,0,+1} at time t and representing the state of
member k of the coalition. For any member, we have an interpretation for the states as surplus, neutral and
distress (same notation prevails as in the absence of cooperation, see Subsection 2.1).
The type of cooperation we aim at modelling can be described as follows. Let us take an element
x=(x(i),i∈{1,···,N})∈{−1,0,+1}N and consider that it describes the state ofN entities at time t≥0, that
is, we haveL(N)t =x. If member i is being distressed (that is, x(i)=−1), then we assume it can borrow from
any member in the group that has a surplus, that is every member j with x(j)=+1. If there are several such
possible lenders, we shall assume that one is chosen randomly among them. Once it is able to borrow, the state
of entity i turns from -1 to 0 and the state of its lender turns from +1 to 0. If there is no entity with a surplus
at that time, then there is no potential lender and member i remains distressed. At a future time, members of
the coalition may reach a surplus state and in this case lending and borrowing relations will resume, between
one entity with a surplus and one distressed entity. We assume that except these borrowing lending relations
there are no other interactions between the members of the coalition. This means that in between interactions,
the state processes of entities evolve independently one from the other. Also, we will assume that entities
are in an equilibrium as long as there are no distressed entities in the group (see Condition 2 below).
We notice that the mechanism we just described prevents an entity from being distressed as long as there
are entities with surplus in the coalition, or, equivalently, an entity will persist in the distressed state−1 only
as long as there are no entities with surplus in the coalition. The process L(N) needs to satisfy:
If there exists k∈{1,...,N} such that L(N)t (k)=−1, then L
(N)
t ∈{−1,0}N .
That means that the state process L(N) is not visiting all the states in {−1,0,+1}N .
Condition 1. The state space of the process. The state space of the process L(N) is:
I :={x∈{−1,0,+1}N | if ∃i with x(i)=−1 then x(j)∈{−1,0}∀j∈{1,···,N}}.
The next condition is the generalisation of the quasi-stationarity assumption for a single entity:
Condition 2. Distribution of the state process conditional on “zero distress”. As long as there are no
distressed members, that is L(N)∈{0,+1}N , the distribution of the process L(N) is stationary.
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The interpretation of Condition 2 is again in terms of an equilibrium: as long as no member of the
coalition is distressed, all entities are able to keep a constant balance between creation and depletion of the
surplus, as there is an expected frequency of being in a state of surplus that remains constant in time.
The reader may find in Appendix A.1 the mathematical definition of the state process L(N) (Definition
A.4) and the construction of a process satisfying Condition 1 and 2. This is given by a process with
independent components that is reflected back into the set I whenever it exits. The reflection occurs because
existing surplus is transferred towards an entity with a deficit.
3.EXPECTED LIFETIME WITH COOPERATION AND OPTIMAL SIZE OF COALITIONS
We are interested in the expected lifetime of an entity, member of an N-coalition. Because the state
process LN is a multivariate process with interdependent components, our approach is to rely on the distress
level in a coalition instead, which is a simpler object.
3.1. The distress level in an N-coalition. The distress level keeps track of the number of distressed entities
at any point in time, without specifying the identities of these distressed entities:
Definition 3.1. (The distress level). The distress level of an N-coalition denoted as Y (N), is the stochastic






where we denote by |A| the cardinality of a countable setA.
The distress level has the very convenient feature of being a Markov process and its distribution is
characterised as follows:
Theorem 3.2. The distress level Y (N) of an N-coalition is a Markov chain with state space {0,1,...,N} and
transition matrix Q(N)=(q(N)(i,j)), given by:
q(N)(i,j)=

αNcN if i=0 and j=1,
α(N−i) if j=i+1 and i=1,···N,
γ(N−i) if j=i−1 and i=1,···N,
0 otherwise, with i 6=j.




Proof. See Appendix A.2. 2
We now comment on the implicit costs and benefits of cooperation for survival in our model; they
result from comparing the properties of the distress level Y (N) with the properties of the process |{k ∈
{1,··· ,N} | `t(k) =−1}|,t≥ 0 that counts the number of distressed entities in a population of size N ,
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1189182
10
but without cooperation (i.e., when the entities evolve independently one from the other). The effects of
cooperation in a group of sizeN are as follows:
- cooperation allows to spend more time in the state of no distress: if Y (N)=0, the process is expected
to remain in this state for a duration of 1/αNcN whileN independent entities for a duration of 1/αcN .
This proves the the mutual insurance is very protective of distress.
- cooperation allows entities to recover from distress: there is a positive rate of recovery from distress
of γ(N−i) when i entities are distressed. Alternatively, the recovery rate from distress is null for non
cooperating entities.
- cooperation can potentially trigger faster cascades of distress: once there is non zero distress, e.g, i≥1 en-
tities are distressed, the next distress in the coalition arrives at a rate α(N−i), while in a non cooperating
group, it arrives at a lower rate of αc(N−i).
As we see, in addition of the convenient Markov property, the distress level Y (N) captures very well
the effects of cooperation. Further, we are going to take the distress level as a state variable in our analysis
of coalitions. First thing, we can now characterise the expected lifetime:
Definition 3.3. The expected lifetime of a member i in an N-coalition containing n≤N distressed members









Remark 3.4. All entities in the coalition have the same distribution conditionally on the the information
about the process Y (N), that is, the conditional distribution of L(N)0 (i) and L
(N)
0 (j) are identical. For this
reason, the expected lifetimes of all entities in a coalition are equal.
Theorem 3.5. The expected lifetime of entity i given that Y0=n is as follows:












where h∗(z):= 1−zα−γ and ξ :=
γ
α;












Proof. See Appendix A.3. 2
3.2. Optimal size of coalitions. We assume that a central planner chooses a group size N∗ (possibly
infinite) that maximises the expected lifetimes of member entities. We also suppose that the central planner
does not observe the state of an entity and choses randomly the entities from the entire population to form a
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coalition. When the size of a coalition isN , we assume that the distress level will satisfy Y (N)0 ∼Bin(N,p),
that is a binomial random variable with parametersN and p, that counts the number of distressed entities
in an N-coalition at time t=0. We assume that p<1, since otherwise any N-coalition is extinct at time t=0










Proposition 3.6. The following hold:
(a) If either γα≥c with p∈ [0,1), or
γ














that is, the optimal coalition size isN∗=∞.




, then both the optimal expected lifetimeH∗ and the optimal coalition sizeN∗













Proof. See Appendix A.4. 2
In Proposition 3.6, we characterise the parameters of populations where it is optimal to cooperate in
infinite groups (N∗=∞), versus finite groups (N∗<∞). When αγ ≥c infinite groups are always optimal,
independently of the value of the parameter p. This means that as long that there is a non null fraction of
surviving individuals to start with (given by 1−p), even very small, it is possible for the distressed entities
to recover through cooperation and achieve an infinite expected lifetime. But when αγ <c, the situation is
different. The expected lifetime may be finite, if the fraction of distressed members is high initially at time





We will refer to π as the optimal probability threshold, as it results from determining the level optimal
cooperation (as opposed to strategical cooperation, in the next section). We observe it increases with the
viability ratio (ξ = γ/α) and with the probability to have a surplus, given survival (1−c). This means
that adverse selection becomes more tolerated when the viability is high and/or the probability of having
a surplus given survival is high. Some illustrations are provided in Figures 1 and 2, where we can observe
(for the case γα≤c), both convergence and divergence to infinity of the expected lifetime of N-coalitions,
asN increases, depending on whether p<π or p>π.
A much finer understanding of the previous result is obtained when computing explicitly the time
evolution of the proportion of distressed entities in infinite coalitions. This is analysed below.
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FIGURE 1. Convergence of the expected lifetime when the size of the coalitionN increases for
γ
α ∈ [0,c] and p≥
1−c
1− γα
. The horizontal red line is the level h∗(p)= 1−pα−γ . Above: α=0.5,
γ
α =0.4,
c=0.5, p=0.4. Below: α=0.5, γα =0.4, c=0.7 and p=0.7. The maximum expected lifetime
H∗ is obtained with corresponding group sizesN∗=5 (above) andN∗=3 (below).
















with τ=inf{t |Zt=0}. Consequently, if Z0=0 then Z≡0. Otherwise if Z0>0, we have:
(i) If γα>1, then the process is absorbed at 0 after a deterministic time τ <∞.
(ii) If γα =1, then Z≡Z0.
(iii) If γα<1, then limt→∞Zt=1.
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FIGURE 2. Divergence of the expected lifetime when the size of the coalitionN increases for γα ∈
[0,c], with p< 1−c1− γα . The horizontal red line is the level h
∗(p)= 1−pα−γ . Above: α=0.5,
γ
α =0.25,
c= 0.7, p= 0.45. Below: α= 0.5, γα = 0.2, c= 0.6 and p= 0.3. The optimal size of coalitions
N∗ is infinite.
Proof. See Appendix A.5. 2
Considering still that Y (N)0 ∼Bin(N,p), we obtain by the strong law of large numbers Z0 = p. Con-
sequently, if γα > 1, by the finite time τ all distressed entities have recovered and there will be no more
distressed individuals in the population ever after. The expected lifetime is indeed infinite in this case. The
case γα = 1 corresponds to the situation where an infinite population will keep through time a constant
proportion of distressed entities. Any distressed entity may recover and become distressed again later on,
with a constant probability through time of being in one of these two situations. Finally, the case γα < 1
corresponds to the situation where the infinite coalitions become extinct in the limit, as t→∞. This
complements the understanding of Proposition 3.6, as we see that the parameter p does not change the
final fate of such populations of becoming extinct asymptotically, nor it influences the rate at which such
populations decline (which is given by α−γ >0). Nevertheless, when p is low enough, the entities can
enjoy infinite expected lifetimes, as stated in Proposition 3.6 (a).
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We may conclude that from the perspective of a central planner aiming at maximising expected lifetimes
in populations, organising cooperation at the level of the whole population is an optimal policy whenever the
conditions of Proposition 3.6 (a) are fulfilled, while cooperation in smaller groups of fixed size is optimal
whenever the conditions of Proposition 3.6 (b) are fulfilled.
A crucial aspect at this point is to understand the self-organisation process of entities in cooperating
groups and whether or not this process reaches by itself an optimal level of cooperation, without exterior
intervention, as in the case of a central planner. This topic is investigated in the remaining of the paper.
4.NASH EQUILIBRIA AND STABILITY OF COALITIONS
We now turn to the study of the formation of coalitions within the frame of strategic game theory. This
will allow us to understand to what extent the expected lifetimes will be improved when entities choose
strategically to enter or not coalitions and coalitions also choose strategically whether to accept outsider
entities and enlarge.
We assume naw that players choose strategies continuously in time, aiming to achieve the highest possible
expected lifetime for themselves. We define the stable coalitions as those Nash equilibria that result in a
coalition size remaining stable through time, independently of the state of distress of its members. Stable
coalitions are those that have reached a certain size and their corresponding decision process will exclude
new members ever after.
We aim at identifying the main drivers of stability of coalitions, in terms of the characteristics of the
population, namely ranges of the parametersα/γ, c and p. The results of this section will be further enhanced
by a numerical analysis in Section 5.
4.1. Formalisation of the game. The game is represented by a sequence of stochastic non cooperative
games Γ=(Γ(N))N≥N0, withN0 being a natural number. The stochastic games are played sequentially,
one after the other: when Γ(N) ends, Γ(N+1) starts, unless the game Γ(N) never ends, in which case
the subsequent games will not be played. The game Γ(N0) starts at time t=0. The variable N of Γ(N)
characterises the size that the coalition has reached, so thatN0 is the initial size of the coalition.
The game Γ(N) corresponds to a game between a coalition of size N and the “outside world”, syn-
thesised in player P	, representing the proportion p of distressed entities, and player P⊕, representing the
proportion (1−p) of not distressed entities. Therefore, at any point in time there are three players to be
modelled only. Even though the outside world contains an infinity of individuals, they only are of two
types and it is sufficient to model only one representative of each type. For simplicity, we always consider
p∈(0,1), so that we do have the three players indeed.
All players choose actions continuously in time, while observing the state process of the N-coalition,
Y
(N)
t , at any time t for the duration of the game. Additionally, playersP	 andP⊕ observe privately their own
state, which is fixed through time (non stochastic). So, the state process for Γ(N) is the Markov processY (N).
The N-coalition will expand to reach the sizeN+1 when the N-coalition decides to include a new member;
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this new member will be chosen randomly among all those that played the action to accept to enter the
N-coalition at that point in time. Because the new member is randomly chosen, it is implicitly assumed that
the N-coalition does not observe the type of the new member whenever both players P⊕ and P	 are playing
the strategy to join the coalition. This is the typical adverse selection problem (see Akerloff [2]). Indeed, with
perfect information, the coalition would privilege the typeP⊕, so that the new member would not be randomly
chosen. As soon as a new member is added, the game Γ(N) stops and the game Γ(N+1) continues from
that point in time, with players being the coalition of sizeN+1 and the outside world, in a similar manner.







- {N-coalition,P⊕,P	} is the set of players.
- I(N) ={0,1,···,N}×{0}×{1} is the state space of the players. When the N-coalition is in state n it
means that it has n distressed entities; the player P⊕ has always 0 distressed entities, and finally, P	
has always 1 distressed entity (being always in the distress state).
- A={a,b}3 is the set of player’s strategies (or actions). The set of actions remains the same, regardless
of the sizeN or state n of the coalition.
- H(N) :{0,1,···,N}×A×{N-coalition,P⊕,P	}→R+ is the payoff function, with values provided in
the Table 2 below. Notice the use of a random variable e(N) that stands for the type of the new member
of the group, should the N-coalition extend by action (a,a,a). More details on this will follow below.
- P (N)=(Q(N),δ{0},δ{1}) are the transition probabilities of the three players. The transition matrix Q(N)
(that is given in Theorem 3.2) corresponds to the state process of the N-coalition, the state of P⊕ is
constantly zero, and the state of P	 is constantly one (by convention, so that the state 1 indicates one
distressed entity).
- n(N)0 ∈{0,···,N} is the initial distribution for the N-coalition, at the time when the game Γ(N) starts.
This means that the state process Y (N) of the N-coalition takes an initial value n(N)0 at the time when
the game Γ(N) is initiated. The initial value will be endogenously determined within the game, except
for the very first game Γ(N0), where it is exogenously specified. This will be further detailed below.
We introduce the following additional rules for the game Γ(N), whereN≥N0:
(i) Strategy process. We suppose each player chooses actions among {a,b}, continuously in time, where
a stands for "accept” (agree to cooperate and extend the coalition) and b for ”block” (or not agree to extend
the coalition, or not apply for becoming a member of the coalition). The decision (or strategy) process is
a stochastic process Dt∈[T(N),T(N+1)], adapted to the filtration generated by the state process Y (N), and
taking values inA={a,b}3, withDt being the action at time t; T(N) being the starting time (with TN =0
ifN=N0) of the game and T(N+1) being the stopping time of the game (defined below in (ii)).













(a,a,b) h(n,N+1) h(n,N+1) 0
(a,b,a) h(n+1,N+1) h(0,1) h(n+1,N+1)
(a,b,b) h(n,N) h(0,1) 0
(b,a,a) h(n,N) h(0,1) 0
(b,a,b) h(n,N) h(0,1) 0
(b,b,a) h(n,N) h(0,1) 0
(b,b,b) h(n,N) h(0,1) 0
TABLE 2. Values of the payoff functionH(N)(n,s,i), where n∈{0,···,N} is fixed. We
consider e∼Bernoulli(p), with p∈(0,1).
(ii) Stopping rule. When the N-coalition is not extinct (that is Y (N)t <N), the game Γ(N) is ended
whenever N-coalition plays a and at least one type of players in the outside world plays a. Whenever the
N-coalition is extinct (that is Y (N)t =N), we consider the game Γ(N) continues, unless player P⊕ steps
in to rescue (that is, N-coalition plays a and P⊕ plays a). By this, we avoid studying enlargements of extinct
coalitions that only lead to extinct coalitions. Therefore, the ending time of the game Γ(N) is defined as:
T(N+1):=inf
{





withE={(a,a,a),(a,b,a),(a,a,b)} andE′={(a,a,a),(a,a,b)}. We use the convention inf∅=+∞. Remark
that T(N) is a stopping time in the filtration generated by the state process Y (N).
(iii) The payoff function. Table 2 summarises the payoff function at time t∈ [T(N),T(N+1)) for each
player, depending on:
- the state of coalition at time t, given by the state of process Y (N)t =n∈{0,1,...,N},
- the action taken by the players at time t,Dt∈A.
As there are finitely many states, players and strategies, that table is exhaustive of the payoffs.
The payoffs make use of the function h, that is the expected lifetime in coalitions. Whenever the actions
are not in E, players have a payoff that equals their own expected lifetime. When actions belong to the
set E, the coalition may expand to include a new member and therefore the payoffs depend on the state
of the new member e(N)∈{0,1}. This new member is assumed to be randomly chosen among the outside
entities that play a. So, for actions that belong to the set E, the payoff for the coalition and for the new
accepted member is h(n+e(N),N+1). For instance, if action (a,a,a) is played, the coalition chooses one
new member at random from the general population, hence e(N) is Bernoulli with parameter p (simply
denoted by e in Table 2). As e(N) is independent from the filtration of the process Y (N), but the decision
D must be adapted to it, we project the payoff on the filtration of the process Y (N). In this case, strategies
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are decided by players upon comparing expected values.
In the cases where action (a,b,a) or (a,a,b) are played, only one type within the outside population is willing
to join the N-coalition, so that e(N) equals the state of this player (hence is not random).






As the state process Y (N) is Markov, we will focus on Markov strategies only, that are only dependent
on the current state. That means that we will impose the stronger requirement that the strategy process
(Dt)t∈[T(N),T(N+1)) satisfies the property: ∀t≥ 0, Dt is a function of Y
(N)
t . Requiring the strategies to
be functions of the current state of the process Y (N) is very useful, as it permits to analyse the game
Γ(N) through the collection of sub-games Γ(n,N),n∈{0,···,N}, with each sub-game Γ(n,N) being a
non-stochastic game, corresponding to payoffH(N)(n,s,i), s∈A and i∈{N-coalition,P⊕,P	}.
A fundamental concept for non zero sum games is the Nash equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium for Γ(N)
at time t, given that Y (N)t =n, is a Nash equilibrium for the sub-game Γ(n,N). The notion of stability of
coalitions is introduced below:
Definition 4.1. (i) An N-coalition is stable if, when Nash equilibria strategies are played in each point in
time, the game Γ(N) is never ending (that is ifN0=N then T(N+1)=∞).
(ii) A coalition that is not stable is said to be unstable.
Remark 4.2. Given the expression in (5), an N-coalition is stable if:
- for any Y (N)t <N , there are not Nash equilibria inE={(a,a,a),(a,b,a),(a,a,b)} and,
- for Y (N)t =N , there are not Nash equilibria inE
′={(a,a,a),(a,a,b}}.
4.2. An analysis of stability of coalitions. In order to analyse stability of coalitions, we will be assuming
in this subsection that players choose their strategies only among the Nash equilibria, at each point in time
and for any size N and state n of a coalition prevailing at that point in time. We will prove the existence
of stable coalitions and characterise some generic conditions for stability versus instability.
First, we characterise stability of N-coalitions in terms of inequalities involving the payoff functions of
the players.
Proposition 4.3. An N-coalition is stable if the following conditions are fulfilled:
(i) for all n∈{0,...,N−1},
h(n,N)>h(n+1,N+1); (6)
(ii) for all n∈{0,...,N} one of the following holds:
h(0,1)>h(n,N+1) (7)
or h(n,N)>ph(n+1,N+1)+(1−p)h(n,N+1). (8)
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1189182
18
Proof. Using the values of the payoff functionH(N) written in Table 2, we need to prove that:
1. the condition (6) together with either (7) or (8) , for n∈{0,...,N−1} are equivelant to: there are not
Nash equilibria inE={(a,a,a),(a,b,a),(a,a,b)} for the corresponding sub-game Γ(n,N);
2. the condition either (7) or (8) , for n = N is equivalent to: there are not Nash equilibria in E′ =
{(a,a,a),(a,a,b)} for the corresponding sub-game Γ(N,N).
We prove the point 1. First, we observe that (a,a,b) is never a Nash equilibrium for n<N . Intuitively,
distressed players have always a strict preference to enter a coalition as this action provides them a chance
to be rescued. One can notice by inspection of the payoff functionH(N) if a non extinct N-coalition plays
a, the player P	 will always play a, as the corresponding payoffs strictly dominates the payoff 0, that would
be obtained by playing b.
Condition (i) is the equivalent of: the action (b,b,a) delivers a strictly higher payoff for the N-coalition
than (a,b,a) and this, for all n∈{0,1...,N−1}, so that (a,b,a) is not a Nash equilibrium in the corresponding
sub-games.7
Condition (ii) for n∈{0,···,N−1} is the equivalent of: either the action (b,a,a) delivers a strictly higher
payoff for the N-coalition than action (a,a,a), or the action (a,b,a) delivers a higher payoff forP⊕ than action
(a,a,a). In either case, (a,a,a) is a not a Nash equilibrium for the sub-games Γ(n,N), n∈{0,···,N−1}.
Now, we prove the point 2. Focussing specifically on condition (ii) and the case n=N we find that (8)
is not fulfilled. So that condition (ii) requires that (7) holds true. But this implies that player P⊕ has a strict
advantage in playing b. Consequently neither strategies inE′ are Nash equilibria. 2
It is useful to take the point of view of the healthy outsiders, that is, player P⊕. It will play b if
h(n,N+1)<h(0,1)= 1αc . Given that the mapping n 7→h(n,N) is decreasing (see Lemma A.7), there is a
critical level of distress, denoted nout(N) such that for n∈{0,...,nout(N)},P⊕ plays a and for n>nout(N)
P⊕ never plays a (too much distress). We call this level the critical level of distress.







As the mapping n 7→ h(n,N + 1) is decreasing, nout(N) is well-defined and nout(N) ∈ {1,...,N}.
Indeed, h(0,N+1)>h(0,1)= 1αc , so that n
out(N)>0 and h(N+1,N+1)=0< 1αc so that n
out(N)≤N .
Lemma 4.5. If nout(N) =N , then an N-coalition is unstable. Non distressed outsiders always want to
enter such a coalition, regardless of its state of distress.
7We do not impose the condition (i) for n = N because we know that there it is not satisfied. We have indeed:
h(N,N)=h(N+1,N+1)=0. This means that an extinct N-coalition will be indifferent between action (a,b,a), that is, enlarging
with a distressed entity, or action (b,b,a), that is, block the entrance of a distressed entity. But both actions lead to an extinct coalition.
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Proof. Suppose that the N-coalition is extinct, that is n=N , then h(N,N)=0. Also, because nout(N)=N
we have h(N+1,N)>h(0,1). Therefore, condition (ii) in Proposition 4.3 is not satisfied and the Nash
equilibrium is {a,a,a}. The coalition extends to incorporate a new member. 2
In the next proposition we give a characterisation of a stable N-coalition using the critical level of distress
nout(N), that will reduce the number of inequalities to check (indeed Proposition 4.3 contained some
overlapping conditions).
Proposition 4.6. An N-coalition is stable if and only if the following hold:





(ii) If nout(N)≤N−2, then for all n∈{nout(N)+1,...,N−1} we have:
h(n,N)>h(n+1,N+1). (10)
Proof. The assertions are direct consequences of Proposition 4.3 and Definition 4.4. Lemma A.7 justifies
the order of the inequalities (9), the denominator of the fraction being strictly positive. 2
We now give a first result on the stability of coalitions. This result is general, as it does not involve the
probability p that is, the proportion of distressed entities in the “outside world" measuring the risk of adverse
selection. It will be followed by an analysis involving the role or the probability p, in the next section.
Proposition 4.7. The following assertions hold:
(i) If γα≥1, then any N-coalition is unstable: n
out(N)=N for allN .
(ii) If γα≥c, then there are not arbitrarily large stable N-coalitions: there existsN
∗ such that nout(N)=N
for allN≥N∗.
(iii) If γα∈(0,c), then n
out(N)<N for allN .








(i) By Lemma 4.5, to show that the N-coalition is not stable, it suffices to show that h(N,N+1)≥ 1αc , that is
nout(N)=N (the healthy outside entities are always willing to join the N-coalition). Using (11) and γα≥1,





> 1αc , because
1+NcN+1
(N+1)cN
>1, this being equivalent to c<1 (and
this condition on c being always satisfied, see Table 1).
(ii) If γα≥c, then limN→∞h(N,N+1)=+∞, so that there isN
∗ so that h(N,N+1)> 1αc for allN≥N
∗.
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(iii) We have nout(N)<N if and only if h(N,N+1)< 1αc . Or, this inequality can be checked easily, using
γ







Proposition 4.7 implies that if stable coalitions exist, they must have the feature that the viability ratio
ξ=γ/α is below 1. When ξ≥1, infinite coalitions form as healthy outsiders are always ready to rescue
even the extinct coalitions. This is consistent with the results on optimal cooperation, as we have seen that
a viability ratio of at least 1 implies infinite lifetimes for coalitions with infinitely many members (Theorem
3.7). We may conclude that entities acting strategically achieve an infinite lifetime also without a central
planner when ξ≥1. Recall that Proposition 3.6 indicates that optimal cooperation that is finite exists only in
the case ξ≤c. Proposition 4.7 suggests that inefficiencies of strategic cooperation may exist: indeed, stable
coalitions may exist also for ξ≥c whenN low, because for small-sized coalitions there may exists a level
of distress such that it becomes unattractive to be entered by healthy outsiders (that is, nout(N)<N). This
is only a necessary condition for stability, but not sufficient one. To obtain sufficient conditions, we need
to examine the role of the level of adverse selection, p, and this is analysed next. Simply stated, the role
of p will be to partition the populations in stable/unstable for the case γα<1, whenN is fixed.
5.BOUNDARIES OF STABILITY AND NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATIONS
5.1. Characterisation of the non-cooperative populations. Whenever the 1-coalitions are stable, there
are no incentives for individuals to form pairs for the purpose of cooperation, as cooperation with another
entity reduces the expected lifetimes of not extinct entities. Indeed, it can be proved that if the probability
of being distressed is above a certain threshold, entities that are in survival will not take any risk to cooperate,
as the probability of having to pair with a distressed entity is too high as compared with the benefits of future
cooperation (the adverse selection risk is simply too high in this case). We give below the exact threshold
for the probability:






such that: if π1 < 1, then for all p > π1 the corresponding 1-coalition is stable and for all p≤ π1 the
corresponding 1-coalition is unstable. If π1=1, then stable coalitions do not exist, regardless of the value
of p∈(0,1).
Proof. We impose the conditions Proposition 4.6 for stability to hold.
First of all we try to determine nout(1). Notice that for stable coalitions 0≤nout(N)≤N−1, which






< 1αc that is:
γ
α+
(1−c)2<1. The conditions in Proposition 4.6 (i) are in this case only one: h(0,1)>ph(1,2)+(1−p)h(0,2)







. This condition is satisfied if and only if γα+(1−c)
2<p.
Condition (ii) in Proposition 4.6 is empty because nout=0 and we have no inequalities to check. 2
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being fixed at 0.8. The non-cooperative populations are those having parameters in the white triangle and the
cooperative populations have parameters in the grey area. The thresholdπ1 is the lineπ1=p(x)=x+(1−c)2
that separates the white from the grey area. The blue curve is given by the function p∗∞(x) =
1−c
1−x and
represents the limiting boundary between stable and unstable coalitions asN→∞ (in the next subsection, this
limiting curve will be analysed in additional details). The area below the blue curve consists of coalitions that
are optimally infinite. Consequently, the white areas that are situated below the blue curve are the strategically
non-cooperative populations where the optimal decision consists in infinite cooperation. In other words,
there the Nash equilibria are suboptimal: individual entities that are not distressed choose to not cooperate
and hence they achieve an expected lifetime of 1αc , but infinite cooperation would lead to an infinite lifetime.
FIGURE 3. The repartition of the stable and unstable coalitions in the plane (γα ,p) and for the
sizes of the coalition N = 1. The vertical red line is the level of the parameter c that is fixed as
c=0.8. Grey area: unstable coalitions; white area: stable coalitions.
5.2. Critical boundaries for stability. Critical probabilities are actually a general pattern:
Proposition 5.2. Suppose the parameters α, γ and δ fixed. For any N , there is a threshold probability
πN ∈ [0,1], depending on the other parameters, such that for p>πN the coalitions are stable and for p≤πN
the coalitions are unstable.
Proof. Suppose that for any p∈(0,1), no stable N-coalitions exist. The statement of the proposition is true
in this case, with πN =1.
Alternatively, suppose that there exists p∈(0,1) such that the corresponding N-coalition is stable. Then,
the conditions in (10) are verified (note that these do not depend on p). Also, the conditions in (9) are
fulfilled for such p and consequently
h(n,N+1)−h(n,N)
h(n,N+1)−h(n+1,N+1)
<1 for all ∈{0,...,nout(N)}.
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We denote πN :=maxn∈{0,...,nout(N)}
h(n,N+1)−h(n,N)
h(n,N+1)−h(n+1,N+1) . It can be easily checked that with such πN , an
N-coalition is stable if and only if p>πN . 2
We now present a numerical study for stable and unstable regions in N-coalitions, using an algorithm
based on Proposition 4.3.




plane for increasing values ofN as follows (from up
left, to right and downward)N=1,N=2,N=10N=20 andN=100. The parameters that are fixed for
all pictures are α=0.5 and c=0.8, while p is varying between 0 and 1 and γ is varying in the interval [0,0.5]
so that γα ∈ [0,1). As for the case N = 1, the white area represents the stable coalitions and the unstable
coalitions are given in the grey area. The blue curve represents the optimal probability threshold π= 1−c
1− γ
α
that was identified as the critical probability that separates optimal finite cooperation from optimal infinite
cooperation (see Proposition 3.6 and expression (4)). In each subgraph of Figure 4, the critical probabilities
(πN),N≥1 are the boundaries separating the white from the grey areas. They are nondecreasing functions
of γ/α. Figure 4 shows that (πN) converge asN increases to the asymptotic boundary π and atN=100
it appears already very closed to it.
In our numerical investigation, we could observe such a convergence of the sequence (πN),N≥1 to
the value π to occur very often. Convergence seems to break partially for large values of the parameter c
larger that 0.9, where we could sometimes observe segments of the boundary πN stabilising above the level
π asN increases. The (partial) convergence of πN towards π implies that when imposing large coalition
sizes (i.e., when the game Γ starts withN0 large), the differences between strategical versus optimal sizes of
coalitions, tend to disappear. But this phenomenon alone gives no indication about the size of inefficiencies,
in particular whenever the strategic size of coalitions is small. This question is analysed next.
5.3. Inefficiency zones of the Nash equilibria. In Figures 5, 6 and 7, we provide a detailed analysis of
inefficiencies of strategic cooperation as compared to the optimal coalitions, in absence of intervention by
a central planner or regulator. Optimal sizes of coalitions, denoted byN∗ were introduced and studied in
Subection 3.2. In order to measure possible inefficiencies, we introduceNmin, as being the size of the smallest
stable coalition, that is: ifN=Nmin an N-coalition is stable, andN<Nmin implies an N-coalition is unstable.
We setNmin =∞ whenever there are no stable coalitions. We shall nameNmin strategic coalition size.
The size Nmin is the maximal size a group reaches within the strategic game Γ = (Γ(N))N≥1, i.e.,
starting with a single entity, assumed non distressed. If stable coalitions exist, then the game evolves through
larger and larger coalitions until it reaches a size where it is stable and then, the corresponding game never
ends. This is indeedNmin. Larger size games Γ(N) withN>N0 will not be played. However, it can be the
case that the game Γ stops before reaching the sizeNmin, because of a smaller, unstable coalition becoming
extinct, before getting the chance to enlarge.
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FIGURE 4. The repartition of the stable and unstable coalitions in the plane (γα ,p) and for different
sizes of the coalitionN . The blue curve is the asymptotic frontier that delimitates the stable and
unstable coalitions whenN→∞, which is depending on p and γα . The vertical red line is the level
of the parameter c that is fixed as c = 0.8. Grey area: unstable coalitions; white area: stable
coalitions.
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In Figure 5, we display for different values of the parameter c and in the plane (γα ,c) the optimal
N∗ versus the strategic Nmin sizes of coalitions. Next, in Figure 6 expected lifetimes are measured, as
corresponding to the optimal coalition sizeN∗ (left pictures) versus the strategic sizeNmin (right pictures).
A last question is how far apart are the expected lifetimes corresponding to optimal cooperation from
those corresponding to strategic cooperation? By answering this question, we obtain the clearest picture
of the inefficiencies of the Nash equilibria. Figure 7 shows the expected lifetime differential between the
optimal coalitionsN∗ and the smallest stable coalitionsNmin (left pictures) and the same differential but
in relative value (right pictures), displayed for different values of the parameters. We may observe that
the higher inefficiencies are obtained around the optimal probability threshold π separating the optimally
finite from the optimally infinite coalitions. Inefficiencies can be infinite (the black areas) whenNmin<∞
while N∗ =∞. Also, relatively high inefficiencies, that can reach 60-70% in loss of expected lifetime
are to be observed for the strategically individualist populations (havingNmin =1), where actual optimal
groups would be larger, but finite, as of 20 or 50 members. The relative inefficiencies for these strategically
individualist populations, are increasing as γα becomes close to c and the probability p increases to 1, meaning
high viability ratio and high risk adverse selection.
From the numerical analysis, we can draw some general conclusions regarding the size of cooperation,
as follows:
- Strategic coalition sizes are less diverse in the space of parameters, as compared to optimal ones: for
a majority of parameters’ ranges, the strategic sizeNmin is either 1 or infinite, and intermediary values
are more rare. This means that in case of some external shocks of systemic nature, that would shift the
values of the parameters of the model, the strategies move from one extreme to the other (i.e., form no
cooperation to infinite cooperation). A central planner would instead choose more often intermediary
range of coalition sizes (i.e., finite sizes with more than one element).
- Effect of the risk of adverse selection. Both optimal and strategic coalition sizes are decreasing with
higher risk adverse selection (i.e., with higher p).
- Effect of the frequency of surplus creation given survival. The lower the value of c is, the more frequent
are non distressed entities able to detain a surplus. The analysis shows that ceteris paribus, the lower
δ, the lower c and the more advantageous cooperation becomes. Indeed, in Figure 5, the areas coloured
in black are wider with when c lower, meaning that infinite cooperation prevails more often. This is true
for both optimal and strategic cooperation.
- Effect of the viability ratio ξ. High viability ratio impacts positively the cooperation: the higher ξ, the
higher the optimal and strategies sizes of coalitions (Figure 5) and the higher their corresponding expected
lifetime (Figure 6). However, it seems that inefficiencies are also increasing with the viability ratio: in
Figure 7, relative inefficiencies are increasing in ξ.
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6.CONCLUDING REMARKS
The aim of this paper was to investigate the extent to which cooperating groups are able to improve
their survival chances, when survival depends on the availability of a resource, and assuming that this is
fluctuating in time and through the population. Cooperation in this setting a mutual insurance mechanism.
The question was answered both using Pareto optimality and a strategic game approach, based upon the
notion of stable coalitions.
Introducing the notion of survival and the risk of extinction is new in the literature studying mutual insur-
ance, as well as the continuous time framework, where we modeled the availability of the resource for each
individual and point in time. Using only very few parameters, we were able to identify the elements that add
value to cooperation, that are: limited adverse selection risk, high rate of surplus creation, or low rate of sur-
plus depletion. The existence of thresholds for these parameters that separate infinite cooperation from finite
cooperation was proved; different aspects of the inefficiencies of the Nash equilibria were analysed numer-
ically. The highest inefficiencies were shown correspond to populations with parameter values situated close
to the thresholds that separate infinite from finite optimal cooperation. These areas may also be interpreted as
“fragility parameter zones”, as small shifts in parameter values may bring cooperation from infinite to none.
Our model may be applied in several economic contexts involving risk sharing. The interbank liquidity
markets are such an example of mutual insurance. Our model may help to understand how the liquidity in
the system may evolve in absence of interventions by the central bank, and it displays the critical parameter
values where the mutual insurance mechanism performs poorly (e.g., when there are no incentives to
cooperate) and requires policy interventions. The model captures the phenomena of liquidity hoarding in
times of high uncertainty about the credit quality of the counter-parties. This is a common feature in financial
crises. Indeed, if the adverse selection parameter p increases above a threshold, the populations in our model
become individualistic; in the context of a financial system this may be interpreted as a disruption of the
normal liquidity provision in times of high uncertainty. The stop in cooperation was shown to be abrupt:
small variations of pmay provoke a population with infinite strategic cooperation to become individualistic
(as seen in Figure 5, where for values of p around the optimal threshold, small variations may have big
impacts on the strategic sizes of cooperation). Consequently, by characterising these fragility zones, our
model may help regulators by providing a guidance of when such disruptions are close to occur. Other
applications, such as in insurance, or management of the surpluses of production at the level of a business
group seem natural to consider and may bring in challenging new developments of our present model.
A.APPENDICES
A.1. Ressource availability with cooperation: definition and mathematical construction. This appen-
dix contains the mathematical definition and construction of the process L(N) that keeps track of the resource
availability at each time t≥0 and for each entity i∈{1,...,N}.
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(a) Optimal coalition size for c=0.4 (b) Strategic coalition size for c=0.4
(c) Optimal coalition size for c=0.6 (d) Strategic coalition size for c=0.6
(e) Optimal coalition size for c=0.8 (f) Strategic coalition size for c=0.8
FIGURE 5. Optimal versus strategic sizes of coalitions in the plane (γα ,p) and for different values
of the parameter c. The black colour represents infinite sizes, the other colours are in the legend.
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(a) Optimal expected lifetime for c=0.4 (b) Strategic expected lifetime for c=0.4
(c) Optimal expected lifetime for c=0.6 (d) Strategic expected lifetime for c=0.6
(e) Optimal expected lifetime for c=0.8 (f) Strategic expected lifetime for c=0.8
FIGURE 6. Expected lifetimes corresponding to optimal coalition sizes N∗, versus strategic
coalition sizes Nmin in the plane (γα ,p) and for different values of the parameter c. The black
colour represents infinite lifetimes, the other colours are in the legend.
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(a) Absolute loss, c=0.4. (b) Relative loss, c=0.4.
(c) Absolute loss, c=0.6. (d) Relative loss, c=0.6.
(e) Absolute loss, c=0.8. (f) Relative loss, c=0.8.
FIGURE 7. Losses of strategic cooperation of size Nmin as compared to the optimal size N∗,
measured in expected lifetime differential, displayed in the plane (γα ,p) for different values of
the parameter c. The black colour represents infinite absolute losses; we normalise these to 1 to
obtain relative losses. The other relative losses are given by absolute losses divided by expected
lifetime for optimal coalitions.
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First, we introduce the main objects involved: the interaction times, i.e., when cooperation occurs, the
evolution of the state process L(N) between these interaction times, and the concrete effect of cooperation
when it occurs.
The interaction times are defined as a sequence of stopping times (θ(n),n≥1), representing the ordered
times when interaction occurs within the group. As explained already, interaction consists in one distressed
entity being rescued by another entity, member of the coalition, having a surplus. We assume that these
are the only interactions between the components of the process L(N) and in between these times, i.e., for
t∈ [θ(n),θ(n+1)), the components of the vector process L(N) are evolving independently one from another.
Consequently, the law of the state process between any two successive transaction times, is described
by a stochastic process `= (`t(1),··· ,`t(N))t≥0 taking values on {−1,0,+1}N with components being
independent Markov chains, with the evolution of any `(k), component k of `, given by the transition matrix
Q(1) in (1). We shall use the notation `x for the process ` satisfying the initial condition `0=x, for some
x∈{−1,0,+1}N .
The effect of cooperation is to reverse the state of distress of an entity, whenever surplus is available
(i.e. whenever there are entities in the surplus state within the coalition). Therefore, the process ` will be
reflected back into the set I whenever it exits. The successive exit times from I are precisely the transaction
times (θ(n)) mentioned above. It remains to define the reflection functions, which specify the state of the
process L(N) after transactions occur. This will be done in Definition A.3 below.
Now, some additional notation:
Notation A.1. We introduce the following functions, defined on {−1,0,+1}N with values in {0,···,N}:
η−(x):= |{i :x(i)=−1}|,i.e. the number of distressed entities, when the state of the coalition is x,
η+(x):= |{i :x(i)=+1}|,i.e. the number of entities with a surplus, when the state of the coalition is x,
where we denote by |A| the cardinality of the setA, forA a countable set.
Notation A.2. We partition the setE :={−1,0,+1}N \I in two disjoint sets as follows:
(i) The states where there are at least as many entities with a surplus as entities in distress, with at least
one entity in distress:
E+ :={x∈{−1,0,+1}N |η+(x)≥η−(x)≥1}.
(ii) The states where there are more distressed entities than entities with a surplus, with at least one entity
with surplus:
E− :={x∈{−1,0,+1}N |η−(x)>η+(x)≥1}.
Definition A.3 (The reflecting functions). We define a family of functions (Rn)n≥0 as follows. For any
n≥1, the functionRn(x)=(Rn(x)(1),···,Rn(x)(N))
Rn :E×Ω→I
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associates with an element x∈E an I valued random variable as follows:
(i) If x∈E+, then
Rn(x)(k)=Bn,k, k∈{1,···,N},
where (Bn,k)k∈{1,···,N},n≥0 is a family of independent and identically distributed random variable Bernoulli
distributed with parameter (1−c), where we recall that c= δγ+δ .
(ii) If x∈E−, then
Rn(x)(k)=
0 for k∈{i :x(i)=+1}∪Cn(x),x(k) for k∈{i :x(i)=0}∪{i :x(i)=−1}\Cn(x),
where for any x∈E−, (Cn(x))n≥0 is a family of independent random variables, where Cn(x) is uniform
on the set of all subsets of {i :x(i)=−1} having precisely η+(x) elements.
The interpretation of the reflection functions is in line with our previous description of cooperation. In
E+, there are more entities with surplus than distressed entities. Therefore transfers of the resource may
occur and allow all distressed entities to recover. The reflection function applied to elements inE+ attributes
only values 0 and +1 to all entities, so that no entity will be in distress. Importantly, the values are chosen
so that Condition 2 is verified (as proved in Lemma A.5 below).
When x∈E−, there are more distressed entities than entities with a surplus. An entity with a surplus will
randomly choose a distressed entity and a transfer of the resource takes place; after the transfer, both entities
reach the neutral state 0. The set of all distressed entities that will recover is given by Cn(x), with cardinal
η+(x), containing randomly selected elements among the set of all distressed entities. We observe that not all
distressed entities can be rescued inE−. There will be precisely η−(x)−η+(x)≥1 distressed entities that
cannot recover and they remain in the state−1; these are the elements of the set {i :x(i)=−1}\Cn(x). The
neutral entities (that are in state 0) will keep their state 0 unchanged when applying the reflecting function.
Definition A.4 (The resource availability process). The resource availability process of the N-coalition is
a stochastic process denoted L(N) taking values in the set:
I={x∈{−1,0,+1}N |min{η−(x),η+(x)}=0},
with:
x0=R0(`0) for an initial state `0∈{−1,0,+1}N .





t−θ(n) for t∈ [θ(n),θ(n+1)),
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where:










defines the state in which the process L(N) finds itself after the trans-
action n+1, taking place at time θ(n+1). The random functions (Rn)n≥0 each associates to a state in
E a state in I (see Definition A.3).
Note that there is a sequence of reflecting functions, and not only one reflecting function, and we used
a unique reflecting function Rn per transaction θ(n). This way, there will be independence of the state
process of the previously visited states, by using an independent random variable at each time to allocate
the resource among the coalition members. Nevertheless, we emphasise that we only need the distribution
of the entities after a transaction takes place, as will be shown in the next sections, so that we could also
have used a single reflecting function in our definition above, without affecting the validity of our analysis.
Also, we can notice that the state space of the process L(N) satisfies Condition 1. We now verify that
Condition 2 is satisfied as well.






and with µ̄N the product measure associated with µ̄ defined in (2).
Proof.




Obviously, ifA /∈{0,+1}N , then P(L(N)t ∈A |η−(L
(N)
t )=0)=0=µ̄
N(A) by definition of µ̄N .
Now, supposeA∈{0,+1}N . We remark that {0,+1}N⊂I. We consider t fixed, with t∈ [θn,θn+1] for
some n, using the notation from Definition A.4 . We write the event {L(N)t ∈{0,+1}N} as the union of
two disjoint events:
B :={L(N)t ∈{0,+1}N}=B1∪B2,
where B1 ={`xnt−θn ∈{0,+1}
N} and B2 ={`xnt−θn /∈ I}∩{R(`
xn
t−θn)∈{0,+1}
N}. The result will follow
from the analysis below:
Suppose that `xnt−θn ∈ I. The law of `
xn
t conditionally on {`
xn
t ∈{0,+1}N} is µ̄N . Indeed, all com-





t−θn therefore the law of L
(N)
t is (µ̄)
N , conditionally onB1.
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t−θn)∈A, by definition of the process L
(N). In this case,
t=θn+1. By Definition A.3, for the process ` to be reflected in a point belonging to A⊂{0,+1}N , the
reflection function necessarily is applied to the region E+ so that we have all L
(N)
t (k) independent and
identically distributed random variables Bernoulli with parameter (1−c). This is to say µ̄N is also the law









A.2. Proof of Theorem 3.2. For simplicity we use the notations Y , instead of Y (N). We denote by
{Pt,t≥0} the semigroup associated with the transition matrix Q(N). This means that Pt is characterised
by an infinitesimal generator:
Ah(n)=
[ϕ(1)−ϕ(0)]αNcN for n=0,[ϕ(n+1)−ϕ(n)]α(N−n)+[ϕ(n−1)−ϕ(n)]γ(N−n) for n=1,..,N, (12)
for any function ϕ bounded and continuous, defined as ϕ : {0,··· ,N}→R. The semigroup Pt and its





We denote by FYt :=σ(Ys,s≤t), the information about the distress level up to time t. We need to prove















where Ex denotes the expectation under P starting from x. We use the technique of localisation to show
that the relation (14) holds for any s≤t, see for eg. [16], page 36.
We consider the N-dimensional Markov chain with independent components `= (`(1),···,`(N)), as
introduced in the previous section, i.e., ` is the canonical realisation of the semigroup P `t characterised by
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with f : {−1,0,+1}N→R, f continuous bounded, ei = (0,...,1,...,0), where 1 is the i component. The
positive constants α, γ and δ are the ones from (1).
In what follows we use Notation A.1 and A.2, and the additional notation:
η0(ξ):= |{i :x(i)=0}|,
so that η−(x)+η0(x)+η+(x)=N for any x∈{−1,0,+1}N .
Let us fix a state x∈I; the neighbouring states (i.e., reachable from x after one transition of `) are either
in I or, when the process exits form I, at the boundary ofE, defined as:
∂E :={x∈{−1,0,+1}N |min{η+(x),η−(x)}=1}.
Indeed, the process ` has independent components, so that it can evolve only by one component at a time.
Additionally, we denote by
∂E+ :=∂E∩E+ and ∂E− :=∂E∩E−.
We introduce the function:
g(x):=max{η−(x)−η+(x),0}. (16)
We notice that for x∈I the function g counts the number of distressed entities, that is:
g(x)=η−(x) for all x∈I, (17)
and at the boundary ofE the function g removes one unit from the set of distressed entities:
g(x)=η−(x)−1 for all x∈∂E. (18)
For a fixed state x∈I, let us detail the values taken by g for the neighbouring states:




(ii) If η−(x)=0 and η+(x)>0, then the neighbouring states are:
(ii.1) For i∈{k |x(k)=0}:
x+ei∈I and g(x+ei)=η−(x+ei)=0,
x−ei∈∂E+ and g(x−ei)=η−(x−ei)−1=η−(x)+1−1=0.
(ii.2) For i∈{k |x(k)=+1}:
x−ei∈I and g(x−ei)=η−(x−ei)=η−(x)=0.
(iii) If η−(x)∈{1,···,N−1}, then (by definition of the set I) η+(x)=0, the neighbouring states are:
(iii.1) For i∈{k |x(k)=0} x+ei∈∂E+ and g(x+ei)=η−(x+ei)−1=η−(x)−1,
x+ei∈∂E− and g(x+ei)=η−(x+ei)−1=η−(x)−1,
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x−ei∈I and g(x−ei)=η−(x−ei)=η−(x)+1.
(iii.2) For i∈{k |x(k)=−1}: no neighbouring states, as these states are absorbing.
(iv) If η−(x) = N , then x = (−1, ··· ,−1) ∈ I, i.e., the absorbing state for `, meaning that it has no
neighbouring states.

















Above, we have used the fact that: if x∈I and η−(x)=n>0, then η+(x)=0 and hence η0(x)=N−n.
We define the first exit time of ` from I as
T1(ω):=inf{t≥0 |`t(ω) /∈I},
and we introduce the shift operator τ(t),t≥0 defined as:
`s(τ(t,ω))=`t+s(ω).
(see Revuz and Yor [27] page 36 for more details). It follows that T1◦τ(s)=inf{t≥s |`t(ω) /∈I}. Also,
we define recursively Tn =T1◦τ(Tn−1) for n> 1. It follows from the definition of Y and the relations
(17)-(18) that the following relation holds:
Yt∧T1 =g(`t∧T1).
We first show the property (14) up to the first exit time from I, which is a stopping time for (F`t ) (the
filtration of the process `), but it is not a stopping time in (FYt ), the filtration of the process Y . We consider
ϕ as above and denote
f :=ϕ◦g,
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We now compute the inner expectations above. If T1>u then `u∈I. Consequently, using (17), we have
1{T1>u}·f(`u)=1{T1>u}·ϕ(η
−(`u)),
and using (19) we get the following.






























The first equality is obtained by using the observation that 1{η−(x)=0} ·A`h◦g(x)=0 for all x but x=0,
where it equals ϕ(1)−ϕ(0). The last equality uses the property that conditionally on η−(`)=0, the process
η+(`) is binomial with parameter 1−c and {`u=0}={η+(`)=0}.












































Taking the limit as n goes to infinity, using the dominated convergence theorem and the fact that there
are finitely many interactions (i.e., times of exit from I) in any given interval [s, t] we deduce that
P(Tn>u|FYu )→1 as n→∞. We conclude that indeed, equation (14) is verified for any s,t with s≤t.
A.3. Proof of Theorem 3.5. As conditionally on the filtration (FYt ) all entities in the coalition have the
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This is a second-order linear recursive equation. By defining ∆(n,N)=N(h(n,N)−h(n+1,N)), we


















+ 1α−γ , otherwise.
(21)






and the result follows from equation (21).
Remark A.6. An alternative representation of h(n,N) obtained also from (22)-(21), which has the benefit










We conclude by a property that follows directly form (23), and that will be useful later on:
Lemma A.7. The mapping n 7→h(n,N) is strictly decreasing.
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A.4. Proof of Proposition 3.6. Let X∼Bin(p,N) so that E[X]=Np. We observe that when ξ= γα =1,










































If ξ>1 the expression diverges to +∞ as N→∞. If ξ<1 this expression is not necessarily convergent
since cN → 0 as N →∞ and it appears at the denominator. Nevertheless, ignoring terms that vanish

















which converges (to zero) if and only if c≥1−p+pξ. As c,ξ∈ (0,1), this last condition is equivalent to
ξ≤c and p∈ [1−c1−ξ ,1].
A.5. Proof of Theorem 3.7. As the entities interact, they are interdependent and the limiting process cannot
be computed using the strong law of large numbers. We employ the theory presented in Ethier and Kurtz




N in the form of a stochastic differential equation (cf. Section
10.4 in [12]. So, for now, N is fixed. We define two counting processes P+(N)t and P
−(N)
t . The process
P
+(N)
t counts the positive jumps of the process Y
(N)
t and the process P
−(N)
t counts the negative jumps of










It follows from the transition matrix of the process Y (N) that is given in Theorem 3.2, that the predictable
compensator of the process P+(N)t is given by process∫ t
0





and the predictable compensator of the process P−(N)t is the process is∫ t
0
q(N)((Y (N)s ),i−1)1{Y (N)s >0}ds=
∫ t
0
γ(N−Y (N)s )1{Y (N)s >0}ds
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β−(N)(Y (N)s )ds, (24)



































To calculate the limit of the process Z(N) forN→∞, we compute the limit of each term in the left hand
side of (25). The martingale M
(N)
t
N is a finite variation martingale bounded, because it takes values in [0,1]),













The quadratic variation of M
(N)
t



















Indeed, β+(N)(Y (N)t )≤αN and β−(N)(Y
(N)


































N ds, the third term in the expression (25) of Z
(N). We write the transition intensities as
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1189182
39





































































and the result follows.
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